The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90067-TzbMath0716.90013OpenAlexW1995220622MaRDI QIDQ753636

Chun Chang

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90067-t

zbMATH Keywords

two-period modelcostly state verification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (1)

Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• On normal hazard in general equilibrium theory
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Existence theorems for weak and usual optimal solutions in Lagrange problems with unilateral constraints. I

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