A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
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Publication:753648
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90077-WzbMath0716.90024MaRDI QIDQ753648
Steinar Holden, Hans H. Haller
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
subgame perfect equilibriumRubinstein perfect information alternating offers bargaining modelwage negotiations
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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