Semiorders and collective choice

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90013-9zbMath0415.90012OpenAlexW2087833917MaRDI QIDQ754093

Julian H. Blau

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90013-9

zbMATH Keywords

semiordersocial choiceArrow's dictatorship theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• On the theory of aggregation
• Choice functions, rationality conditions, and variations on the weak axiom of revealed preference
• Voting and group decision functions
• Interval representations for interval orders and semiorders
• Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination
• Foundational aspects of theories of measurement
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• Semiorders and Choice Functions
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• The Nature of Equilibrium with Semiordered Preferences
• Semiorders and the Theory of Choice
• A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem

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