The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
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Publication:754097
DOI10.1007/BF01763051zbMath0415.90087WikidataQ56460168 ScholiaQ56460168MaRDI QIDQ754097
Publication date: 1979
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
ordinal preferencessimple gamegroup decisionscooperative n-person gamedictator problemnecessary and sufficient conditions for nonemptiness of corewinning coalitions
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