Satisfactory mechanisms for environments with consumption lower bounds

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90100-XzbMath0416.90010MaRDI QIDQ754747

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumgame theoretic modeldominant strategiesagents strategiesconsumption lower boundspivotal mechanismpublic decision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism

Cites Work

• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

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