A dynamic solution concept for abstract games

DOI10.1007/BF00934721zbMath0416.90088OpenAlexW2005233520MaRDI QIDQ754782

Prakash P. Shenoy

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00934721

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsolution conceptsabstract gamesdynamic solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (13)

Cooperation with externalities and uncertainty ⋮ On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach ⋮ Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton ⋮ Absorbing sets in roommate problems ⋮ A general characterization for non-balanced games in terms of \(U\)-cycles ⋮ The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ On the solution of \(w\)-stable sets ⋮ The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement ⋮ Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes ⋮ Models of coalition or alliance formation ⋮ On coalition formation in simple games: A mathematical analysis of Caplow's and Gamson's theories ⋮ Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games

Cites Work

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• An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
• Games with unique solutions that are nonconvex
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• Communications to the Editor—A Counterexample in Game Theory
• A game with no solution
• The Proof That a Game May Not Have a Solution

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