Sufficient conditions for Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory

DOI10.1007/BF00934113zbMath0416.90095MaRDI QIDQ754787

Cruz, J. B. jun., George P. Papavassilopoulos

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash differential gamesrecall of the previous trajectoryStackelberg differential gamesstrategies with memorysufficient conditions for optimal strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

Related Items (9)

Linear feedback closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for descriptor systems with multilevel hierarchy ⋮ Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information ⋮ Dynamic optimization and forward looking processes ⋮ Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game ⋮ An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination ⋮ Equilibrium strategies in dynamic games with multi-levels of hierarchy ⋮ A control-theoretic view on incentives ⋮ Closed-loop strategies in continuous dynamic game with multi-level of hierarchy ⋮ The Maximum Principle for Global Solutions of Stochastic Stackelberg Differential Games

Cites Work

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• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
• Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
• Variational Problems Involving Functional Differential Equations
• Differential Games with Delay
• Control of Functional Differential Equations of Retarded and Neutral Type to Target Sets in Function Space
• An unsymmetric Fubini theorem
• New results in the theory of differential games with information time lag

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