Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives

DOI10.1007/BF01442897zbMath0417.90017MaRDI QIDQ755417

Peter C. Fishburn, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessrankingprofilesagreement ratiopositional score vectorspositional scoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes ⋮ Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes ⋮ Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules ⋮ Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences ⋮ On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner ⋮ The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes ⋮ On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives ⋮ A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser ⋮ The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner

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