A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
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Publication:755418
DOI10.1007/BF00139450zbMath0417.90019OpenAlexW2009262788MaRDI QIDQ755418
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00139450
social choicerandom samplingmanipulationlarge voting schemesmanipulable voting processmisrepresentation of preferencesrepresentable voting processstatistical point of viewvoting processes
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