Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-IzbMath0722.90015OpenAlexW2018421378MaRDI QIDQ757220

Barton L. Lipman

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-i

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationendogeneous delayed entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Continuous time vs. backward induction ⋮ Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis

Cites Work

• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
• Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Sequential Equilibria
• Limit Pricing and Uncertain Entry

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