A local theory of cooperative games

DOI10.1007/BF01755480zbMath0722.90087MaRDI QIDQ757262

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionlocal corestable situations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (4)

On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game ⋮ On the strong \(\beta\)-hybrid solution of an \(N\)-person game ⋮ Two-sided altruism as a motive for intergenerational transfer ⋮ A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets

Cites Work

• Stable extensive game forms with perfect information
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Cores in noncooperative games
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
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