The structure of social decision functions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4zbMath0555.90004OpenAlexW2052937845WikidataQ57927176 ScholiaQ57927176MaRDI QIDQ761329

David Kelsey

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90099-4

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto principleacyclicitytransitivitydirected graphssocial preferencesArrow Impossibility Theoremcollective rationality conditionweaker assumptions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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The liberal paradox: A generalisation, Universal characterization of non-transitive preferences, Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle, Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters, Acyclic choice and group veto, Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts

Cites Work

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• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions