Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90069-9zbMath0555.90019OpenAlexW2157997319MaRDI QIDQ761336

Shmuel Zamir, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90069-9

zbMATH Keywords

public goodproportional taxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (5)

Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities ⋮ Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects. ⋮ ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting ⋮ Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization

Cites Work

• The equivalence of superadditivity and balancedness in the proportional tax game
• Second best taxation as a game

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