Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01769814zbMath0556.90104OpenAlexW2047804223MaRDI QIDQ762080

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 1984

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769814

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriasignallinglack of information on one sidetwo-person repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

Long information design ⋮ Splitting games over finite sets ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES ⋮ Designing communication hierarchies

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