Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
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Publication:763345
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9261-8zbMath1274.91174OpenAlexW1989443453MaRDI QIDQ763345
Publication date: 9 March 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9261-8
neutralityanonymitypositive responsivenessweak Pareto principlemethod of majority decisionstrong Pareto principle
Related Items (6)
On anonymous and weighted voting systems ⋮ Collective choice rules with social maximality ⋮ Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings ⋮ Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited ⋮ Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making ⋮ Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
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