Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes

DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9170-2zbMath1274.91168OpenAlexW2096781379WikidataQ30054738 ScholiaQ30054738MaRDI QIDQ763358

Serguei Kaniovski, Alexander Yu. Zeigraev

Publication date: 9 March 2012

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9170-2

zbMATH Keywords

dichotomous choiceCondorcet's jury theoremcorrelated votes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

The importance of expertise in group decisions ⋮ A Condorcet jury theorem for couples ⋮ Epistemic democracy with correlated voters ⋮ Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury ⋮ Exact bounds on the probability of at least \(k\) successes in \(n\) exchangeable Bernoulli trials as a function of correlation coefficients ⋮ Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit ⋮ Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation

Cites Work

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• A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority voting rules
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Deliberation and Voting Rules

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