The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.004zbMath1279.91060OpenAlexW2052274362MaRDI QIDQ765204

Sandro Brusco, Marcin Dziubiński, Jaideep Roy

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumDowns modelfree entryrunoff system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (6)

Divergent platforms ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes ⋮ Mixed equilibria in runoff elections ⋮ Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules ⋮ Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games

Cites Work

• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
• Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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