When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.012zbMath1279.91104OpenAlexW3125237247MaRDI QIDQ765217

Vikram Manjunath

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.012

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessPareto efficiencystrategy-proofnessrationingsequential priority ruleslower-bounds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible ⋮ The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ The division problem under constraints

Uses Software

• BASS

Cites Work

• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
• Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: an axiomatic analysis
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule

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