On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.011zbMath1279.91122OpenAlexW2018543046MaRDI QIDQ765218

Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Ruth Martínez, Jorge A. Oviedo

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/12444

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcore

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

WARP and combinatorial choice ⋮ Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Ordered sets
• On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
• What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

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