Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:765223
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.005zbMath1279.91089OpenAlexW2020060422MaRDI QIDQ765223
Jun Wang, Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.005
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Genetic learning as an explanation of stylized facts of foreign exchange markets
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Experimental methods and elicitation of values
- Call market book information and efficiency
- Star-shaped probability weighting functions and overbidding in first-price auctions
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- A genetic algorithm simulation of a transition economy: An application to insider-privatization in Croatia
- Explaining the facts with adaptive agents: The case of mutual fund flows
- Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market
- Learning dynamics, genetic algorithms, and corporate takeovers
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Auctions with artificial adaptive agents
- On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market
- Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
- Expected utility theory and prospect theory: One wedding and a decent funeral
- Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments
- GENETIC ALGORITHM LEARNING TO CHOOSE AND USE INFORMATION
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data
This page was built for publication: Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
