Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.016zbMath1279.91090OpenAlexW2066962369MaRDI QIDQ765224

Ryuji Sano

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.016

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsascending auctioncore-selecting auctionfree-rider problempackage clock auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices ⋮ Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
• Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Combinatorial auction design

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