Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.009zbMath1279.91041OpenAlexW3122091871MaRDI QIDQ765230

Philipp C. Wichardt

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.009

zbMATH Keywords

existencebounded rationalityvaluation equilibriumimperfect recall

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

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Cites Work

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• Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• The absent-minded driver's paradox: Synthesis and responses
• Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation

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