A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

DOI10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8zbMath1233.91203OpenAlexW2010157650MaRDI QIDQ766250

Toyotaka Sakai

Publication date: 23 March 2012

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitystrategy-proofnessmatching with contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts

Cites Work

• Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage