A class of simple games

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Publication:770599

DOI10.1215/S0012-7094-58-02537-7zbMath0083.14301OpenAlexW2091481536WikidataQ60306526 ScholiaQ60306526MaRDI QIDQ770599

John R. Isbell

Publication date: 1958

Published in: Duke Mathematical Journal (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1215/s0012-7094-58-02537-7




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