Acceptable points in games of perfect information

DOI10.2140/pjm.1960.10.381zbMath0093.33004OpenAlexW2014267214MaRDI QIDQ772430

Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1960

Published in: Pacific Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1960.10.381

zbMATH Keywords

applications of probability theory and statistics

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