Awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice
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Publication:776224
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_1zbMath1435.91077arXiv1906.10562OpenAlexW2990940652MaRDI QIDQ776224
Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu, Ben Abramowitz
Publication date: 30 June 2020
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.10562
Related Items (3)
Don’t Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond ⋮ Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries ⋮ The distortion of distributed voting
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- The distortion of distributed voting
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