Awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_1zbMath1435.91077arXiv1906.10562OpenAlexW2990940652MaRDI QIDQ776224

Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu, Ben Abramowitz

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.10562

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Don’t Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond ⋮ Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries ⋮ The distortion of distributed voting

Cites Work

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• Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition
• Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions
• Subset Selection Via Implicit Utilitarian Voting
• Randomized Social Choice Functions Under Metric Preferences
• The distortion of distributed voting

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