If animals know their own fighting ability, the evolutionarily stable level of fighting is reduced

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.07.024zbMath1442.92206OpenAlexW1998782554WikidataQ51985930 ScholiaQ51985930MaRDI QIDQ776430

John M. McNamara, Alasdair I. Houston

Publication date: 9 July 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.07.024

zbMATH Keywords

thresholdevolutionary stable strategyhawk-dove gamefighting ability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Assessing predation risk: optimal behaviour and rules of thumb
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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