The iterated continuous prisoner's dilemma game cannot explain the evolution of interspecific mutualism in unstructured populations

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.07.025zbMath1442.92108OpenAlexW2079747638WikidataQ50988931 ScholiaQ50988931MaRDI QIDQ776453

István Scheuring

Publication date: 9 July 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.07.025

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitycoevolutionadaptive dynamicsreciprocal altruismvariable investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Dual lattice model of the evolution of facultative symbiosis with continuous prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Eco-evolutionary logic of mutualisms

Cites Work

• Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
• The Evolution of Cooperation
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