Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00710-8zbMath1444.91101OpenAlexW2611498503MaRDI QIDQ776848

Helmuts Āzacis

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00710-8

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyinformation disclosureseller's revenuesequential first-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions

Cites Work

• A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand
• Signal jamming in a sequential auction
• He who must not be named
• REPUTATIONAL BIDDING
• An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
• Manipulative auction design

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