Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures

DOI10.1007/s00182-019-00695-zzbMath1450.91023OpenAlexW3125704252MaRDI QIDQ776855

Harold Houba, Yukihiko Funaki, Evgenia Motchenkova

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00695-z

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsmarket powercorePareto efficiencyequilibrianegotiationsinfrastructureassignment gamesconsumer protectionnon-linear pricingprice-fee competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
• Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
• A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly
• Additively decomposed quasiconvex functions
• Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games