Information sharing in democratic mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00708-2zbMath1447.91035OpenAlexW3010052562MaRDI QIDQ776856

Hans Gersbach, Volker Britz

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00708-2

zbMATH Keywords

samplingvotingpublic goodspollinginformation sharingdemocratic mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Critical decisions and constitutional rules
• Private polling in elections and voter welfare
• Public information and electoral bias
• Welfare reducing polls
• Tax rules
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1
• Experimentation in Federal Systems *
• Robust Mechanism Design

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