Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
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Publication:776858
DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00700-5zbMath1444.91121OpenAlexW2213929344WikidataQ126526151 ScholiaQ126526151MaRDI QIDQ776858
Publication date: 13 July 2020
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00700-5
Cites Work
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- Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
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