A model of parallel contests

DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00705-0zbMath1444.91106OpenAlexW2618392778WikidataQ126320464 ScholiaQ126320464MaRDI QIDQ776862

Wei-Torng Juang, Kuo-Chih Yuan, Guang-Zhen Sun

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00705-0

zbMATH Keywords

effort effectparallel contestsparticipation effectrent extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Optimal seedings in interdependent contests

Cites Work

• Seller competition by mechanism design
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Population uncertainty in contests
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

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