Influence in private-goods allocation

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.04.001zbMath1437.91238OpenAlexW2908915304MaRDI QIDQ776963

Madhav Raghavan

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

non-bossinessstrategy-proofnessmatching with contractshousing marketsprivate-goods allocationsingle-object auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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