Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
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Publication:776971
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.002zbMath1444.91133OpenAlexW3024361914MaRDI QIDQ776971
Publication date: 13 July 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02613918/file/JME2020.pdf
Related Items (3)
Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
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