Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
From MaRDI portal
Publication:777455
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.03.004zbMath1444.91089OpenAlexW2917485276MaRDI QIDQ777455
Muhammad Mahajne, Mostapha Diss
Publication date: 7 July 2020
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02003292/document
Related Items (4)
IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule ⋮ Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
- Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
- Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
- Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
- Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Majority committees
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
- The socially acceptable scoring rule
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
- Condorcet winners and social acceptability
- Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
- Condorcet winning sets
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
- A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
- Sur un probl?me de g?om?trie diophantienne lin?aire. I. Poly?dres et r?seaux.
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
This page was built for publication: Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
