Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109122zbMath1442.91042OpenAlexW3016127648MaRDI QIDQ777663

Bo Chen

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109122

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctioncontestdisclosurestochastic entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
• Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry
• Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
• On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
• Contest architecture
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• On the optimal design of biased contests

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