A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
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Publication:777682
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109154zbMath1442.91031OpenAlexW3016727806MaRDI QIDQ777682
Sarvesh Bandhu, Abhinaba Lahiri, Anup Pramanik
Publication date: 7 July 2020
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109154
Related Items (4)
A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population ⋮ The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
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