Common-value group contests with asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164zbMath1442.91003OpenAlexW3017598513MaRDI QIDQ777696

Din Cohen, Aner Sela

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/2007.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationgroup contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

Is there free riding in group contests?

Cites Work

• The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
• The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
• Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Conflict and distribution
• Information in Tullock contests
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Bayesian Implementation

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