Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109202zbMath1442.91054OpenAlexW3023320822MaRDI QIDQ777726

Ottorino Chillemi, Benedetto Gui, Stefano Galavotti

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109202

zbMATH Keywords

signalcontingent contractsex-post information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Continuity in auction design
• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
• A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design

This page was built for publication: Optimal contracts with contingent allocation