Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109247zbMath1442.91046OpenAlexW3026304704MaRDI QIDQ777766

Zhi-Xian Yu

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/60821/1/Manuscript.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargaininghistory-dependenceendogenous commitmentalternating-offer bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
• WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Joint Projects without Commitment

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