Realism and empirical equivalence

DOI10.1007/s10992-019-09526-8zbMath1484.03005OpenAlexW2970494909WikidataQ127324025 ScholiaQ127324025MaRDI QIDQ777948

Eric Johannesson

Publication date: 8 July 2020

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09526-8

zbMATH Keywords

realismempirical equivalenceunderdeterminationQuinetheoretical termsindispensability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

• Embeddability, syntax, and semantics in accounts of scientific theories
• Some remarks on the bearing of model theory on the theory of theories
• Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist. Materials and perspectives
• The probabilistic no miracles argument
• Glymour and Quine on theoretical equivalence
• Carnap and logical truth
• Every two elementarily equivalent models have isomorphic ultrapowers
• The no miracles argument without the base rate fallacy
• Computability and Logic
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