The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_14zbMath1435.91061arXiv1809.03454OpenAlexW2989950847MaRDI QIDQ777959
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Philip Lazos
Publication date: 30 June 2020
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.03454
makespan minimizationmechanism designPareto frontierprice of anarchyprice of stabilityscheduling unrelated machines
Applications of game theory (91A80) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (3)
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