On the Price of Anarchy of cost-sharing in real-time scheduling systems
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Publication:777962
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_15zbMath1435.90068arXiv1907.05926OpenAlexW2991031009MaRDI QIDQ777962
Eirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias
Publication date: 30 June 2020
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.05926
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