On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17zbMath1435.91097OpenAlexW2991411207MaRDI QIDQ777967

Weian Li, Qi Qi, Yaonan Jin

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17

zbMATH Keywords

approximation ratiosecond-price auctionMyerson auctionanonymous pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms

Cites Work

• Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
• Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
• Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Making the Most of Your Samples
• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
• Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
• The sample complexity of auctions with side information
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design

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