Topological price of anarchy bounds for clustering games on networks

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_18zbMath1435.91037arXiv2011.09717OpenAlexW3104308279MaRDI QIDQ777968

Guido Schäfer, Pieter Kleer

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.09717

zbMATH Keywords

random graphscoordination gamesprice of anarchyNash equilibrium existenceclustering games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Random graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C80) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

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• Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
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• Generalized graph \(k\)-coloring games

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