On core-selecting and core-competitive mechanisms for binary single-parameter auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_20zbMath1435.91098OpenAlexW2989905393MaRDI QIDQ777973

Evangelos Markakis, Artem Tsikiridis

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_20

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions

Cites Work

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• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
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• Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
• Knapsack auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions

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