Self-consistent feedback Stackelberg equilibria for infinite horizon stochastic games

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00329-9zbMath1443.91036OpenAlexW2977937868WikidataQ127215847 ScholiaQ127215847MaRDI QIDQ778081

Yilun Jiang, Alberto Bressan

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00329-9

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg equilibriumnoncooperative gamefeedback strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (1)

On the generic structure and stability of Stackelberg equilibria

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stackelberg solutions of feedback type for differential games with random initial data
• A review of dynamic Stackelberg game models
• Min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies with closed-loop information structure
• Continuous-time Markov chains. An applications-oriented approach
• M-matrix characterizations. I: nonsingular M-matrices
• On the generic structure and stability of Stackelberg equilibria
• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies in linear-quadratic problems
• Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
• Feedback Stackelberg Solutions of Infinite-Horizon Stochastic Differential Games
• The Maximum Principle for Global Solutions of Stochastic Stackelberg Differential Games

This page was built for publication: Self-consistent feedback Stackelberg equilibria for infinite horizon stochastic games