Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
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Publication:778092
DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00325-ZzbMath1444.91096OpenAlexW95315752MaRDI QIDQ778092
Abhimanyu Khan, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters
Publication date: 30 June 2020
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1630278/guid-43baa9c3-c947-4214-997b-695f8fa390e4-ASSET1.0.pdf
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Spatial models in economics (91B72)
Cites Work
- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
- Duopoly with price and quantity as strategic variables
- Endogenously determined price rigidities
- How noise matters.
- Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: Equivalence of price and quantity strategies
- An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
- Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
- Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly.
- Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
- Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
- The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
- Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints
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