Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market

DOI10.1007/s13235-019-00322-2zbMath1444.91136OpenAlexW3124274916WikidataQ127491379 ScholiaQ127491379MaRDI QIDQ778095

Yasuhiro Shirata

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00322-2

zbMATH Keywords

product differentiationBertrand competitionevolutionary dynamics on networksnetworked market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium
• Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets
• Contagion and efficiency
• Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets
• Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
• Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right
• An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
• Cournot vs. Walras: a reappraisal through simulations
• Evolutionary stability on graphs
• Sluggish consumers: An evolutionary solution to the Bertrand paradox.
• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency
• A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games
• The replicator equation on graphs
• Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior

This page was built for publication: Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market